Negotiations between mining companies and Aboriginal communities: Process and structure by O'Faircheallaigh, C.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiations between mining 
companies and Aboriginal 
communities: process and 
structure  
  
 
C. O’Faircheallaigh 
 
No. 86/1995 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1036-1774 
ISBN 0 7315 1760 1 
 
Foreword 
 
Between March and May 1995 the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
sponsored a thematic seminar series titled ‘Policy Aspects of Native Title’. The 
following eight seminars were presented: 
 
• ‘Relative allocative efficiency of the Native Title Act 1993 and the Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1976’ by Siobahn McKenna (March). 
 
• ‘Resource development agreements on Aboriginal land in the 1990s: features 
and trends’ by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh (March). 
 
• ‘Negotiations between Aboriginal communities and Mining companies: 
structures and process’ by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh (April). 
 
• ‘Tourism enterprise and native title: the Tjapukai Dance Theatre, Cairns’ by 
Julie Finlayson (April). 
 
• ‘Funding native title claims: establishing equitable procedures’ by Jon Altman 
and Diane Smith (April). 
 
• ‘Native title and land management’ by Elspeth Young and Helen Ross (April). 
 
• ‘Native Title Act 1993: latest developments and implementation issues for 
resource developers’ by Jon Altman (May). 
 
• ‘Native title and regional agreements: the Kimberley case’ by Patrick Sullivan 
(May). 
 
Five of these seminars have now been revised into CAEPR Discussion Papers Nos 
85-89. Of the others, Siobahn McKenna’s seminar was published earlier as CAEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 79 and Jon Altman and Diane Smith’s seminar was published 
as ‘Funding Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Representative Bodies under the 
Native Title Act 1993’ (Issues Paper No. 8, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native 
Title).  
 
Owing to the pressing public policy significance of the issues addressed in this series, 
these discussion papers are intentionally exploratory and aim to disseminate 
information to a wider audience than that able to attend the seminars at the Australian 
National University. 
 
 
 
Jon Altman 
Series Editor 
July 1995 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
During recent years, Aboriginal communities in Australia have become increasingly 
involved in negotiating mineral development agreements with mining companies and 
relevant State agencies. Two factors influence the extent to which indigenous 
interests can achieve benefits from such negotiations. The first is the bargaining 
power available to them associated, for example, with land ownership. The second, is 
the ability of Aboriginal communities to both mobilise such leverage and extend it. 
This paper draws heavily on the author’s own experience in assisting Aboriginal 
communities in Cape York to prepare for and undertake negotiations, especially in 
relation to the Cape Flattery and Skardon River projects. Issues addressed include: 
the mechanisms for establishing common community goals; the means available to 
ensure access to vital information for commercial bargaining purposes; the need for 
adequate resources for equitable negotiations; the need for appropriate institutional 
structures; and the need for good working relations between technical staff and 
political decision-makers. At the end of the paper the key issue of the implementation 
of conditions in agreements is raised, especially if the significant potential benefits to 
communities, often foreshadowed, are to be realised. 
 
The later sections of this paper draw on material which will be included in the 
author’s contribution ‘Negotiating with resource companies: issues and constraints 
for Aboriginal communities in Australia’ in R. Howitt, J. Connell and P. Hirsch (eds) 
Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples, Oxford University Press. 
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1 
Introduction 
  
During recent years Aboriginal communities in Australia have become increasingly 
involved in negotiating mineral development agreements with mining companies and 
relevant state agencies.1 Two key factors determine the extent to which indigenous 
Australians can achieve benefits from such negotiations, or can utilise them to avoid 
outcomes they regard as undesirable. The first is the bargaining power available to 
them. This is influenced, in particular, by the status of the land involved (Aboriginal 
or non-Aboriginal), the legal context within which projects are developed (which 
varies considerably between individual states and territories), and the specific nature 
of the projects, mining companies and mineral commodities which are involved. The 
second factor is the extent to which Aboriginal communities mobilise the bargaining 
power they possess, and take advantage of any opportunities to enhance that power. 
Maximisation and effective use of bargaining power does not occur automatically, but 
rather requires Aboriginal communities and organisations to develop appropriate 
processes and structures. This paper discusses a number of key issues which must be 
addressed in developing such processes and structures.  
 
In discussing process it should be stressed that it is not simply a means to an end (in 
this case the benefits created, or costs avoided, through a mining agreement). Process 
is extremely important in its own right, particularly for indigenous people who have 
often been excluded from decisions which affect them or who have been subject to 
processes they find alienating and degrading. The importance of process is 
increasingly recognised, for example, in the literature which evaluates public 
programs and policies. Evaluations of labour market access programs in the United 
States have revealed that while program managers are primarily concerned with 
program outcomes, for example, enhanced access to job opportunities, clients base 
their evaluations heavily on the ‘quality of processes occurring within a program’, 
and particularly on the way they are treated by program staff (Hougland 1987).  
 
Closer to home, an extreme case clearly illustrates the importance of process. In the 
late 1980s a gold mine was developed on Horn Island in the Torres Strait, but was 
abandoned after the developer encountered financial difficulties. The mine was left in 
a state which had the potential to cause major environmental damage, leading local 
Kaurereg people to stop hunting and fishing in its vicinity. The Queensland 
Government is now taking remedial action to ensure that such damage does not occur. 
Indigenous people affected by the project were excluded from decision-making 
processes both in relation to approval of the mine and development of a remedial 
program. As a result, they have lost faith in the relevant authorities, and regardless of 
how positive the outcomes from the remedial program actually are, they are very 
unlikely to believe that the danger of environmental damage has been averted, and as 
a result will continue to experience economic and social deprivation and emotional 
stress (Stock and Lane 1994).  
 
To date, little has been written on developing appropriate structures and processes for 
use by Aboriginal communities (or other indigenous communities) in negotiations 
with mining companies. There is a large literature on negotiations between 
multinational companies and national governments, but quite apart from the fact that 
the circumstances of Aboriginal communities are generally very different to those of 
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national governments, most of this literature focuses on the content of mineral 
agreements and on negotiating tactics. Little of it deals with the actual processes and 
structures utilised in pursuing those agreements or in developing specific approaches 
to negotiation (for a review see O’Faircheallaigh 1981). 
 
Reflecting the paucity of secondary source material, this paper draws heavily on the 
author’s own experience in assisting Aboriginal communities in Cape York to prepare 
for and undertake negotiations in relation to the Cape Flattery and Skardon River 
projects. Cape Flattery is an existing silica sand mine located near Hope Vale, which 
has been operated for over 20 years by Cape Flattery Silica Mines (CFSM), a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the Mitsubishi Corporation. During 1991-92 the Hope Vale 
Community Council negotiated terms for the renewal of CFSM’s existing leases, and 
the issue of a new lease to allow expansion of silica mining. Skardon River is a kaolin 
mining and processing operation currently (June 1995) being established near Old 
Mapoon on land owned by people who now live mainly at Old Mapoon, Napranum 
and New Mapoon. Negotiations in regard to this project occurred during 1994 
between the developer, Venture Exploration, and the trustees of the land and the 
Marpuna Corporation (supported by the Cape York Land Council). Both projects 
operate under Queensland’s Mineral Resources Act 1989, which requires mining 
companies operating on Aboriginal land to seek the permission of the trustees before 
mining leases can be granted (for details see O’Faircheallaigh 1995). 
 
In drawing on this experience the benefit of hindsight is acknowledged - some of the 
points made below are the result of realising, after the event, that things could have 
been managed more effectively. It should also be stressed that in discussing process 
and structure, the use of specific examples is illustrative rather than prescriptive; what 
works well in one community may not necessarily be appropriate in another. 
However all communities must address the issues raised in the following sections if 
they are to negotiate successfully with mining companies.  
 
The paper takes as its starting point a decision by a community and/or its leaders to 
enter into negotiations with a mining company. This is of course not the only option 
open to Aboriginal people faced with a mining project which will utilise their land or 
otherwise affect them. They may decide to try and stop the project by whatever 
means available, and as a result may see little reason to negotiate with the developer. 
This may be because they feel that the effort and resources involved in undertaking 
negotiation and subsequently managing an agreement is not worth the benefits likely 
to be obtained, and therefore decide to ignore the development entirely. However, 
Aboriginal communities are increasingly entering into negotiations with mining 
companies and with State agencies involved in the project approval process. It should 
be stressed that their decision to do so need not reflect either support for mining or an 
expectation that negotiations will yield substantial benefits. It may just as easily result 
from a desire to obtain some benefit from a project which Aboriginal people would 
prefer not to proceed with, but which they cannot stop; and/or a desire to avoid 
negative impacts associated with a project, particularly in terms of damage to the 
environment, cultural heritage or significant sites.  
 
Establishing community goals 
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The first and perhaps most important step in mobilising bargaining power is to 
establish community goals in relation to negotiations. This requires effective 
processes not only to seek community views on relevant issues, but also to 
disseminate information on existing or likely project impacts and on the options 
available to the community, so that people can make informed decisions. Information 
dissemination is particularly important where new projects are concerned or when 
mining has not previously occurred near a community, because people often cannot 
draw on previous experience in gauging likely impacts or in establishing preferred 
outcomes.  
 
Consultation and information dissemination should not cease once negotiations begin, 
because the negotiation process itself will yield additional information and may open 
up unexpected opportunities or close off preferred options, requiring the community 
to reassess its position. It should also be stressed that the consultation process is very 
important not only in establishing goals, but also in ensuring community support 
throughout the negotiation process. Obviously, people are much more likely to 
support their community leaders and their advisers if they have been well informed 
about the issues involved and feel that they have helped shape negotiating positions.  
 
A key part of the consultation and information dissemination process, in both the 
Cape Flattery and Skardon River projects, involved the conduct of Economic and 
Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs). These were not meant simply to predict impacts 
and suggest ameliorative measures; they played a key role in developing negotiating 
positions which sought to address the aspirations and concerns of the communities. 
 
In the case of Cape Flattery, the ESIA proceeded as follows. Draft terms of reference 
were drawn up on the basis of the consultants’ prior research, and these were revised 
after a preliminary visit to the community and discussions with community leaders. 
The terms of reference set out the areas of economic and social impact which would 
be subject to research and raised issues to be canvassed with the community. There 
was no intention to use the terms of reference to restrict the scope of the ESIA; rather 
they provided a basis on which to proceed with the research. It was expected that 
other issues would emerge as the research progressed.  
 
Desk-based research and fieldwork were undertaken to develop a profile of the 
community, and in particular, to identify categories of people who might be affected 
differently by the mining at Cape Flattery. Government and company records were 
used to establish basic information relating to mining operations at Cape Flattery. For 
example, to study the patterns of employment and the extent and use of royalty 
payments under the existing agreement, negotiated on behalf of Hope Vale in 1971 by 
Queensland’s Department of Aboriginal and Islander Affairs. The first phase of 
consultations then began. This involved a series of meetings with specific groups 
within the community, including wives of workers at the mine, the workers 
themselves, and the community rangers. Individual interviews were carried out with 
over half of Hope Vale’s adult population; and a major public meeting was held. 
These meetings and interviews were used to provide people with the information 
gained from desk-based research and initial fieldwork, and to identify their concerns 
and aspirations about mining at Cape Flattery. The local television broadcasting 
capacity available through the BRACS system was utilised both to explain the 
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purposes of the ESIA and as another way of disseminating information. Three young 
people from the community worked with the consultants on the project, and their help 
was invaluable both in obtaining and in disseminating information. 
 
Additional desk-based research was undertaken in response to issues raised by 
community members and not included in the terms of reference, and initial proposals 
were developed aimed at maximising benefits and minimising costs associated with 
Cape Flattery. These were discussed with groups and individuals in the community, 
and in some cases alternative approaches were devised which appeared more likely to 
satisfy the (at times conflicting) aspirations of various groups.  
 
An ESIA report was then prepared for the Hope Vale Community Council. This 
included a community profile and factual information about CFSM’s operations and 
future plans, an extensive and detailed discussion of people’s concerns and 
aspirations, and a series of recommendations which offered concrete strategies for 
dealing with concerns and pursuing aspirations. It also suggested a monitoring 
program for ongoing measurement and review of social and economic impacts 
(Holden and O’Faircheallaigh 1991).  
 
The ESIA report was used as a basis for preparing the negotiating position put to 
CFSM/Mitsubishi, an outcome which was facilitated by the inclusion of one of the 
ESIA consultants in Hope Vale’s negotiating team. For example, Chapter 10 of the 
report contained a detailed analysis of CFSM’s corporate structure and its accounting 
practices and operations, and demonstrated how these gave Mitsubishi considerable 
latitude in defining ‘profits’. This indicated the need to shift away from the profit-
based royalty contained in the existing compensation agreement, and such a change 
became part of Hope Vale’s negotiating position. Chapter 7 recorded the concern of 
Hope Vale women at being unable to visit their husbands at the mine, which provides 
only single accommodation. Hope Vale negotiated for CFSM to refurbish and make 
available a disused accommodation barracks for use by visitors from the community.  
 
Most members of the Hope Vale Community Council attended the negotiating 
sessions, and this provided an important mechanism for maintaining a flow of 
information to the community on the proceedings. When the negotiations and the 
related legal proceedings reached a crucial phase, a public meeting was organised at 
Hope Vale and the Council Chairman and the negotiators reported back to community 
members and sought their views on how to proceed. Mining was suspended at Cape 
Flattery for the afternoon so that workers could also attend.  
 
The ESIA process in relation to Skardon River was similar (Holden and 
O’Faircheallaigh 1995), but complicated by the fact that the Mapoon people live in 
three communities: Napranum, near Weipa; Old Mapoon, about an hour’s drive 
away; and New Mapoon, near the tip of Cape York and about 15 hours drive from 
Weipa. Public meetings were held with people from all three communities. A survey 
was administered to most traditional owners for the land affected by the Skardon 
project, and issues were canvassed in informal discussions with community members. 
A Steering Committee of seven people was utilised in order to maintain 
communication as negotiations proceeded. This included some of the Deed of Grant 
in Trust (DOGIT) trustees, representatives of the traditional owners as well as 
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representatives of the Marpuna corporation (the entity which administers the recently 
re-established community at Old Mapoon), and members from each of the three 
communities. Whenever members of the negotiating team visited any of the 
communities, they tried to meet with Steering Committee members and brief them on 
developments. In addition, some members of the Steering Committee travelled to 
Brisbane and Cairns for negotiating sessions, but the cost involved, combined with 
logistical problems, limited the Steering Committee’s involvement.  
 
Effective consultation and information dissemination is time-consuming and 
expensive. For example, six months was required to plan, prepare and circulate draft 
copies of the Cape Flattery ESIA, while over $60,000 was required to fund the 
Skardon River ESIA. 
 
As indicated above, the ESIA process does not rely exclusively, or even mainly on 
formal public meetings; to do so would be to greatly reduce the likelihood that 
community opinion would be thoroughly canvassed, since certain categories of 
people (for example women, the aged, young people) are less likely to attend such 
meetings or to voice their opinions if they do attend. Public meetings are also not an 
ideal medium for disseminating information, since effective communication will 
often require one-on-one or small group discussions.  
 
Nevertheless public meetings do play a key role, both because they are an essential 
part of community decision-making, and because time is often a restricting factor 
during negotiations, meetings can become the major form of consultation and 
information dissemination. Thus, great care needs to be taken to ensure that they are 
conducted in a way which makes them as conducive as possible to the articulation of 
community opinion and the effective communication of information. 
 
As people who live or work in Aboriginal communities will realise, public meetings 
are in fact not always conducted in this way, because time is scarce and/or because 
enough consideration is not given to adapting ‘European-style’ meeting processes to 
local needs. It is still sometimes the case that those responsible for conducting 
meetings fly in to a community on the appointed day; set the meeting room up in a 
way which emphasises their separateness from local people (for instance by sitting 
behind a table piled high with imposing-looking documents); present a large amount 
of information, some of which may be highly technical; and raise alternative options 
for decision. They then ask for input from those attending the meeting. Some people 
will respond, but many will not, and indeed some will already have left the meeting 
because they fail to perceive its relevance or because they have more urgent matters 
to attend to. If sustained discussion occurs, it may have to be cut short so that the 
visitors can catch their return flight.  
 
Within the constraints created by available time and resources, there are a number of 
things which can be done to enhance the role of public meetings as effective tools for 
information dissemination and community decision-making. Two examples can be 
cited. It should be stressed again that these are by way of illustration; what is feasible 
and appropriate will depend very much on the individual community concerned.  
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The first involves giving some thought to catering for the needs of young children 
while the meeting is in progress. If children are not catered for, before long they will 
start demanding attention from adults, and almost inevitably it will be women who 
will respond. They may be forced to leave the meeting temporarily, or for good, and 
so will be disadvantaged in terms of their access to information and decision-
making.2 Alternatively, anticipating such problems, they may not come to the meeting 
in the first place. It can make a considerable difference if, for example, children are 
taken into account in choosing a location for the meeting (for instance by holding it 
near an area where children can play safely, and where physical access is easy, 
allowing both parents and children to slip in and out and check on each other). 
Children’s needs should also be taken into account in catering for a meeting, for 
example, by ensuring a supply of refreshments they will enjoy. These may sound like 
matters of detail, but they can have a major impact on women’s involvement in a 
meeting. It should also be noted that arrangements of this sort are very difficult to 
make if those attending the meeting arrive in a community on the day it is held.  
 
The second example involves the time periods over which meetings are conducted. It 
can be much more productive to spread meetings out, holding a series of short 
sessions rather than one or two long ones. For example, a session might be held from 
10.00 am to noon; a second one from 2.00 to 4.00 pm; and a third on the morning of 
the following day. An arrangement of this sort allows people time to deal with other 
commitments, some of which may be both urgent and inflexible; it is also very useful 
to have a vehicle available during breaks in the meeting, making it easier for people 
to attend to their commitments and return in time for the next session. People also 
have time between sessions to think about and discuss issues raised in the meeting; 
and, very importantly, they have an opportunity to discuss matters informally with 
community leaders and advisers. It is often during informal discussions between 
sessions or in the evenings that key issues are first raised, and they can then be 
canvassed with the wider group and discussed more fully when the meeting resumes. 
Finally, planning a series of relatively short sessions provides greater flexibility, for 
example, allowing the discussion to continue past the scheduled finishing time if 
important matters are being dealt with. 
 
Some of these points may appear to be self-evident. But if they are not attended to, 
the impact on community consultation and information dissemination can be severe, 
which in turn greatly reduces the likelihood that subsequent negotiations with mining 
companies will be effective in meeting community aspirations and concerns.  
 
Ensuring access to information 
 
One objective of processes such as ESIA is to acquire specific sorts of information for 
use in negotiations, in particular, information about community goals and about the 
historical or likely impact of a mining operation. But other forms of information must 
also be acquired. These include details of project economics, particularly expected 
commodity prices, revenue, costs and profits; the size and structure of the workforce; 
anticipated environmental impacts; and corporate structure and strategies. The last is 
of particular significance. A major part of any successful negotiation strategy must be 
to achieve an accurate understanding of the other party, of its strengths, weaknesses 
and core objectives in relation to the project concerned. 
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In this context, it may be extremely important to obtain information about the 
structure of an international corporation as a whole, and not just of the subsidiary 
responsible for developing or operating a specific project. This is very evident from 
the experience of the Hope Vale community with CFSM. A major part of CFSM’s 
physical and financial transactions were with other entities within the Mitsubishi 
group of companies. For example, most of CFSM’s loan finance came from 
Mitsubishi Banking Corporation, and a high proportion of its silica output was sold to 
Japanese foundry and glass manufacturing companies in which Mitsubishi had an 
interest. Against this background, it was necessary to get a clear picture of how 
CFSM fitted into Mitsubishi’s overall corporate structure before negotiating positions 
could be developed, for example, in relation to the nature of an appropriate royalty 
regime.  
 
Recent developments in information technology have made it both easier and cheaper 
to obtain access to some forms of information. For instance on-line, full-text access to 
newspapers and to company reports can allow very rapid searching of these sources 
for information on specific projects or companies. Material identified in this way can 
immediately be downloaded to a personal computer, sorted and stored for future use.  
 
However, some of the information required for negotiations can be difficult and 
expensive to obtain. The issues involved are often complex; for example, more than 
2,400 separate corporate entities were identified in attempting to unravel Mitsubishi’s 
structure. In addition, relevant information may not be in the public domain. A case in 
point relates to commodity prices. While prices for homogeneous commodities traded 
on open markets (such as gold) are readily available, those for heterogeneous 
commodities which are generally sold on the basis of contracts (such as bauxite, silica 
or kaolin) can be very difficult to obtain. In both the Cape Flattery and Skardon River 
cases, a variety of trade sources and advice from commodity specialists were utilised 
in order to obtain relevant price data. Some information could only be obtained 
through personal contacts of individuals on the negotiating teams (for instance with 
international trading houses and with a major international environmental 
organisation which maintains extensive databases on multinational corporations). 
 
Complex and extensive information may also be required regarding non-economic 
issues, such as the likely environmental impact of specific mining or processing 
operations, management of significant sites, and mine rehabilitation.  
 
In some areas information may be provided by the companies themselves, but this 
will have to be independent verified. When the Cape York Land Council 
commissioned an independent audit of Venture Exploration’s original Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) for the Skardon River project, it revealed a number of major 
deficiencies, and the company agreed to complete a revised EIS. Clearly, access to 
research expertise and to skilled negotiators is essential if the information required by 
Aboriginal communities is to be obtained and put to good use, a point which raises 
the issue of access to resources.  
 
Access to resources  
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Negotiating with mining companies is an expensive business. Legal, economic and 
negotiating expertise must be obtained; fieldwork conducted; legal proceedings 
undertaken; and travel expenses incurred in bringing Aboriginal people and their 
advisers to negotiating sessions. The cost of the last item alone can be substantial, as 
illustrated by the Cape Flattery negotiations. These involved eight series of meetings 
over a period of eight months, mainly in Cairns. Two of the negotiating team had to 
be flown from Sydney for each meeting, a third from Brisbane, while community 
leaders had to travel from Hope Vale.  
 
It is difficult to accurately estimate the costs involved in any set of negotiations, and 
the cost can vary substantially from case to case depending, for example, on the 
nature of the project and of the community affected by it, the duration of the 
negotiation process, and the extent to which legal proceedings are involved. As an 
indication of the scale of expenditure required, Hope Vale’s costs in undertaking the 
Cape Flattery negotiations exceeded $300,000. 
 
While they are expensive, negotiations can yield a very high return. For example, 
over the period 1972-92 Hope Vale received an average of $20,000 per annum in 
royalty income from the Cape Flattery mine (Holden and O’Faircheallaigh 1991: 
109). As a result of the new conditions negotiated with CFSM, the community 
received over $500,000 in 1993 alone. Thus it more than recouped its outlay on the 
negotiations in a single year. This does not take into account other benefits the 
community received under the revised agreement such as employment and training, 
access to land, environmental management and infrastructure development. The 
Mapoon people are guaranteed a minimum annual income comparable to that 
currently received by Hope Vale from the Skardon River project from year six of 
production onwards, and if company forecasts of output are accurate its income will 
be considerably higher (O’Faircheallaigh 1995).  
 
A problem in this negotiating process is that Aboriginal communities often do not 
have access to the funds needed to meet ‘up front’ expenditure which would allow 
them to make maximum use of their negotiating position. Given this situation, 
arrangements for provision of funding are absolutely crucial. Funding can be 
arranged on the basis of specific allocations by government, obligations placed on 
project developers, or through a broader legislative framework. 
 
In the Northern Territory, many of the costs involved are borne by the land councils, 
which are entitled, under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, 
to obtain income from operating mines on Aboriginal land within their jurisdiction. 
These land councils have statutory responsibilities to assist owners of land affected 
by resource development. However, they have always faced severe resource 
constraints in attempting to fulfil their wide range of statutory responsibilities. They 
carry an additional burden as a result of the Northern Territory Government’s practice 
of appealing all land grant decisions made under the Land Rights Act and have 
encountered problems in recovering legal costs subsequently awarded against the 
Northern Territory Government. The land councils have consequently tried to insist 
that mining companies bear at least those costs which are directly associated with 
consultations and negotiations including for example, travel, catering and other costs 
involved in consulting traditional owners.  
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There is no legislative provision in Queensland or in Western Australia for statutory 
land councils, and Aboriginal communities have had to make more ad hoc funding 
arrangements. Requests were made to the Queensland Government for assistance 
with Hope Vale’s negotiating expenses in relation to Cape Flattery. These were not 
successful, though the Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander 
Affairs (DFSAIA) did share the costs of conducting the ESIA with the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) and the Hope Vale Community Council. 
Hope Vale was therefore thrown back on its own resources, and at times encountered 
major difficulties in funding the negotiation effort.  
 
In the Skardon River case, the initial costs of providing advice and support to the 
Mapoon people were borne by the Cape York Land Council, which obtains its base 
funding from ATSIC. However, that funding does not include an allocation for 
negotiating mining agreements. Funding of negotiations is seen as a State government 
responsibility, and the Land Council was severely constrained in terms of the 
assistance it could provide. The community’s legal advisers argued that Venture 
Exploration, as the proponent of the Skardon development, should bear the costs 
involved in obtaining the consent of the Mapoon Trustees and traditional owners. The 
company did agree to meet some legal and negotiation expenses and to help fund the 
ESE, along with the DFSAIA. However, it should be noted that under current 
Queensland legislation there is no statutory requirement for developers to meet the 
costs of Aboriginal landowners, which places Aboriginal people in a vulnerable 
position. In addition, these costs arise at a time when mining companies are facing a 
whole range of other project development costs and are not yet in receipt of income 
from their investment. Particularly for smaller companies such as Venture 
Exploration, the necessity to fund Aboriginal participation in negotiations can 
represent a substantial burden.  
 
It is also important that funding be available during project development when it is 
most required. For example, the Cape York Land Council initially requested funds for 
an ESIA of the Skardon River project in August 1993, but it was October 1994 before 
funding was finalised. Because of the project development timetable, the ESIA then 
had to be completed in a much tighter time frame than was desirable.  
 
Elsewhere in Australia, Aboriginal communities and organisations have met similar, 
and in some cases more severe, problems in obtaining adequate funds to support their 
negotiation effort, placing them at a serious disadvantage and consequently imposing 
substantially greater economic, social, cultural and psychological costs on some 
communities.  
 
It is important to stress that when it comes to resources to support negotiations, there 
is a fundamental inequality between mining companies and governments, on the one 
hand, and indigenous communities, on the other. This can be illustrated using two 
examples, the first involving the Cape Flattery negotiations. After four sets of 
meetings between the parties many issues had been resolved, but a few key ones 
remained in dispute. As often happens at this stage in negotiations little progress was 
made in the next two sets of meetings, as both sides sought to maintain their positions 
on important issues. But while a company with Mitsubishi’s resources faces no 
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difficulty in maintaining its involvement in negotiations during such a period of 
deadlock, Hope Vale found it extremely difficult to do so, putting it under great 
pressure to reach agreement. Had a breakthrough in negotiations not occurred soon 
afterwards, the community’s financial position would have become untenable.  
 
The second example involves the Mapoon community. In 1993 the Mining Warden’s 
court was due to consider a number of issues relating to the Skardon project. Failure 
to have itself represented at the hearings could have weakened the community’s 
ability to subsequently object to the development and/or negotiate a compensation 
agreement. But the Marpuna corporation had no funds available to engage legal 
representation. The ATSIC commissioner for the region became aware of the 
dilemma, and persuaded a firm of solicitors to take on the case on the basis that he 
would then explore funding options with the relevant government authorities. Had he 
been unsuccessful, the firm would have had to carry the loss.  
 
It should be stressed that communities will often require access to funds simply to 
determine ‘threshold’ issues such as whether or not to negotiate with a mining 
company. An informed decision on such matters will usually require access to at least 
some information, for example, regarding the community’s legal situation and the 
likely impact of the project involved. In addition, the community may have to expend 
some funds in order to keep its options open in relation to legal proceedings until a 
decision is made on whether or not to negotiate (for instance by lodging objections to 
project approval in a Mining Warden’s court).  
 
It can be argued that Australian politicians, state and federal, are guilty of 
inconsistency (if not hypocrisy) particularly when they complain that Aboriginal 
people hold up resource development, but then fail to ensure that Aboriginal 
communities and organisations are adequately funded to participate in relevant 
decision-making processes. Governments clearly need to review, as a matter of 
urgency, arrangements for funding Aboriginal participation in negotiations and 
related activities. One option is to impose a charge on mineral exploration licences, 
and pool the revenue earned in a fund which could then be utilised to support 
Aboriginal negotiating efforts.3 
 
Another resource, the value of which is often underestimated, is time. In fact it is a 
crucial input into the negotiation process. Time is needed to allow researchers to 
establish appropriate methodologies and to collect the wide variety of information 
discussed above, particularly where community consultations are involved; to permit 
community members to evaluate the reliability and sensitivity of their advisers; to 
analyse the data collected and on this basis to develop negotiating positions and 
strategies; to have legal and economic advisers and community leaders examine the 
succession of draft agreements which typically emerge during a negotiation; and to 
seek community approval for final negotiating positions. In the Cape Flattery case, 
over two years elapsed between initiation of discussions in Hope Vale and signing of 
an agreement with CFSM.  
 
However Aboriginal communities are often constrained in the time they have 
available, usually as a result of time lines established by legal processes, by political 
pressure from governments, or by project development schedules. For example, the 
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Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, as amended in 1987, sets time 
limits on consultation and negotiation processes. The Skardon River project 
negotiations had to be accelerated because commercial considerations (particularly 
the requirement to raise loan capital) required the developer to have an agreement in 
place within a very short time frame. Schedules can also be compressed at specific 
points within the overall negotiation process, for instance because of the dates set for 
court hearings. The scheduling of Mining Warden’s hearings in relation to both the 
Cape Flattery and Skardon River projects had this effect. 
 
Governments can create major problems for Aboriginal people by pushing for 
accelerated development schedules (sometimes, though not always, at the developer’s 
request). An extreme example is offered by the EIS approval process for Skardon 
River. At one stage the Mapoon community was given seven days to respond to a 
draft EIS which was several hundred pages in length. The community’s solicitor 
responded as follows:  
 
As to your request that our comments on that report be provided within 7 
days, all the writer can say is ‘you can’t be serious’. To suggest that our 
clients, the traditional owners of the subject land ... can give your department 
an informed and considered response to a document of such complexity and 
size is absolutely astounding in its naivety (cited in Stock and Lane 1994: 
5.13). 
 
Pressure to hasten decision-making is not only inimical to Aboriginal interests, it 
often has little effect because of the range of other factors which can delay project 
development. These include adverse market conditions, industrial disputes, 
engineering or geological problems and delays in raising finance.  
 
Time constraints create severe problems when they limit the capacity to accumulate 
information and, in particular, to undertake consultations with Aboriginal 
landowners. In some cases, appropriate adjustments can be made to conventional 
research processes. For instance, the authors of the Skardon River ESIA undertook to 
provide a brief interim report which simply listed the key aspirations and concerns of 
traditional owners so that negotiations could proceed on principles for an agreement; 
a full draft ESIA was provided later, prior to finalisation of the agreement. In other 
cases negotiators simply have to manage with the limited time at their disposal; the 
capacity to identify key issues and pieces of information then becomes crucial. 
 
Institutional structures 
 
Aboriginal communities also need an effective institutional framework within which 
to pursue negotiations. This is required for procedural reasons which, while they may 
appear mundane, are in fact indispensable. For example, it is necessary to maintain a 
point of contact between participants over time, to commission and collate research, 
to sign contracts and to issue invoices and process payments. In more substantive 
terms, an appropriate institutional structure is required to permit accumulation of 
knowledge and expertise, to ensure that the lessons learned from one set of 
negotiations are remembered and applied in the next. A team of experts can be 
brought together on an ad hoc basis for specific negotiations, but in the absence of 
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appropriate institutional arrangements, that expertise is quickly dissipated once an 
agreement is signed. Such arrangements also facilitate the essential task of 
monitoring agreements once they are concluded, an issue discussed below.  
Because most Aboriginal communities are likely to have only one (or at most two) 
resource projects on their land, community-based institutions (such as community 
councils) are usually not very well placed to provide the specialist expertise required 
to negotiate with mining companies and subsequently to monitor implementation. 
This highlights the value of regional institutions such as land councils, which over a 
number of years will deal with a series of resource developments and in doing so 
have an opportunity to build up their negotiating skills. Because they operate on a 
larger scale, land councils are also better able to employ specialist staff, for example, 
lawyers with a background in resource development as well as environmental experts. 
In addition, they can play a coordinating and facilitative role in developing long-term 
relationships between particular communities and ‘external’ specialists such as 
university-based researchers. This can both broaden the pool of available expertise 
and reduce difficulties created by the (often related) problems of high staff turnover 
and ‘burnout’ among land council field personnel.  
 
It is no accident that land councils have been the subject of sustained and harsh 
criticism by the mining industry and by some state and territory governments in 
Australia. They are accused of being bureaucratic, ineffective, and of preventing 
mining companies from dealing directly with traditional landowners to quickly reach 
agreements which are acceptable to the developer and those most directly affected by 
mining projects. While land councils may not always operate with maximum 
efficiency, there is no doubt that these criticisms reflect, in substantial measure, their 
success in extracting more favourable conditions for Aboriginal landowners.  
 
An alternative approach is for individual communities to retain a commercial law 
firm which can act as an institutional base in undertaking negotiations and in 
subsequently monitoring implementation of agreements. This arrangement can work 
well where the firm has appropriate expertise (both in a legal sense and in dealing 
with Aboriginal people and organisations) and assigns a senior member of staff to the 
task, and where continuity in personnel can be ensured. For example, Hope Vale was 
advised during the Cape Flattery negotiations by a partner in a Cairns-based law firm, 
and the same person has, over the last three years, been responsible for monitoring 
implementation of the agreement. This continuity has been very important in allowing 
Hope Vale to deal with the (substantial) difficulties which have arisen in ensuring 
effective implementation of certain aspects of the Cape Flattery agreement.  
 
Unfortunately, these conditions are not always achieved, and some Aboriginal 
communities have had unfavourable experiences with commercial law firms, at times 
suffering from these firm’s frequent changes in responsible personnel and/or from 
allocation of briefs to junior staff or to individuals who lack the necessary legal and 
interpersonal skills. Such experiences may become rarer as legal work associated 
with native title matters generates a wider base of expertise within private legal 
practices.  
 
There is also the issue of cost to consider, given that commercial legal fees are 
substantial. This issue is in turn linked to the question of scale. If only one 
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community in a region has a resource project on its land, reliance on a commercial 
firm may be appropriate. If a number of communities and projects are involved, it 
may be more efficient to develop appropriate in-house expertise through a land 
council. Of course, these two outcomes represent ends of a spectrum. In practice, it 
may be appropriate for a land council to develop expertise in certain areas and obtain 
external advice on more complex matters. This is how the Northern Land Council 
(NLC) operates, for instance, in-house staff deal with most routine matters relating to 
mining negotiations, but it does retain external environmental, geological and legal 
expertise when this is required to deal with specific issues. A final reason why 
institutional structures are important relates to the role they can play in facilitating 
interaction between technical advisers and negotiators, on the one hand, and 
community leaders, on the other. Because of its importance, this point is discussed 
separately in the next section.  
 
Relationships between ‘technical’ staff and community leaders 
 
One point which emerges clearly from the international literature on negotiations is 
that the development of effective communication, and more generally of good 
working relationships, between technical staff (negotiators, legal and economic 
advisers) and political decision-makers is crucial in ensuring a satisfactory outcome 
to negotiations (O’Faircheallaigh 1981: 90). The same applies to negotiations which 
involve Aboriginal communities, except that in this case the lines of communication 
must often encompass a broader range of actors and includes traditional landowners, 
members of community councils and office-holders in land councils. 
 
Little has been written about relations between technical advisers and Aboriginal 
political leaders and communities in Australia. This may partly reflect a 
defensiveness created by disparaging comments regarding the supposedly 
manipulative role of ‘white advisers’, and partly the fact that few of those involved on 
either side of the relationship have had the opportunity to document their experiences.  
 
Effective communication between technical staff and community leaders is absolutely 
essential if the former are to develop a clear understanding of Aboriginal aspirations 
and concerns, and if the latter are to have a sound grasp of the issues being dealt with 
through the negotiation process. In addition, development of good rapport is crucial if 
advisers and community leaders are to work together as a negotiating team, 
maintaining cohesion in their dealings with mining company representatives and 
developing a capacity to react quickly to opportunities and threats, as these arise in 
negotiations. Where a good relationship is established the individuals involved will 
often be able to develop appropriate negotiating tactics as a meeting unfolds.  
 
Effective communication does not occur automatically, but will happen more freely 
as trust develops between the two groups. Specific measures can also be taken to 
encourage it. Involvement of negotiators in ESIAs and other community consultation 
processes can be very helpful, giving them a chance to become more familiar with the 
communities concerned. Very importantly, it also allows them to spend time with 
Aboriginal participants in situations which the latter find comfortable, for example 
fishing expeditions, as opposed to city office blocks or hotels, where some Aboriginal 
people do not feel very comfortable.  
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The actual conduct of negotiations themselves is also very relevant. Allowing time 
before and after negotiating sessions is essential, to plan strategies and later to 
evaluate their success and to reach a common understanding of positions put by the 
mining company. It also provides an opportunity for less formal interaction among 
members of the negotiating team. This may be relatively easy to ensure when 
negotiations are undertaken within a land council where permanent staff reside in a 
specific location such as Darwin, Alice Springs or Cairns. Where negotiating teams 
are put together to deal with specific projects, as was the case with Cape Flattery and 
Skardon River, it is by no means easy to achieve. Maintaining continuity among both 
advisory personnel and Aboriginal representatives is also very important, if the 
rapport built up at one stage of the process is to be carried through to the next.  
 
While there may be points in the negotiation process where it is useful for technical 
advisers from both sides to meet in the absence of principals, it is generally beneficial 
for community leaders to be present throughout the negotiation process, even if they 
do not actively participate in much of the discussion. This allows them to see at first 
hand how the advisers are attempting to achieve the goals they themselves have set, 
and helps ensure that they retain a sense of involvement. (It also reminds mining 
company officials that they must take the concerns of Aboriginal people seriously if 
they are to achieve a negotiated settlement.) A majority of Hope Vale councillors, for 
example, attended every one of the negotiating sessions with Mitsubishi, which was 
of considerable help when final negotiating positions had to be established and 
defended.  
 
The NLC’s policy is that it prefers traditional owners to attend negotiating sessions, 
but leaves the decision to them. While traditional owners will always be involved in 
key meetings, for instance, when matters of general principle are being discussed or 
when a draft agreement is close to completion, detailed negotiations are often 
conducted by NLC and mining company officials. However, in some recent cases 
traditional owners have chosen to attend all negotiating sessions.4  
 
For financial and logistical reasons, it is often not possible for all of those who wish 
to attend negotiations to do so. In such cases probably the best solution is for at least 
one community leader to participate in all sessions, ensuring that a degree of 
continuity is maintained, and for the others involved to attend in rotation, allowing 
some sense of continued involvement. 
 
The general point here is simple but crucial. Negotiations, from the Aboriginal 
perspective, ultimately involve political decisions about the mix of costs and benefits 
which a community will accept and about the distribution of those costs and benefits 
within a community. Aboriginal communities and their leaders, rather than non-
Aboriginal advisers, should make such political decisions. But Aboriginal leaders will 
not be in a position to offer their communities informed recommendations, or make 
informed decisions, unless effective communication is maintained between 
themselves and the technical advisers and negotiators and, more generally, unless 
they are fully involved in the negotiation process. 
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Implementation 
 
It is easy to assume that the community’s interests are secured once negotiations are 
concluded and an acceptable agreement achieved, but in fact this is far from the case. 
It is necessary to ensure that agreements are actually put into effect (or continue to be 
put into effect) and that their implementation takes account of changing 
circumstances; given that agreements may apply for up to 21 years, the latter point is 
of considerable importance. Ensuring that agreements are properly implemented 
requires sustained attention over time. 
 
That this is not easy to achieve is obvious, for example, from the history of the 
agreements negotiated in relation to the Ranger and Nabarlek uranium mines. In both 
cases major problems occurred regarding the non-implementation of certain 
provisions. For example, under the Ranger Agreement (Article 13.2), the 
Commonwealth undertook to ‘require the Joint Venturers to ensure that appropriate 
training facilities are made available’ where Aboriginal organisations lacked the skills 
to ‘satisfactorily provide’ goods and services to the Ranger mines. At certain times 
the contracting company owned by the major Aboriginal organisation in the region, 
the Gagudju Association, did indeed lack the skills necessary to compete successfully 
for contracts, but the Commonwealth did not fulfil its obligations under Article 13.2. 
To cite another example, QML did not submit annual reviews of its training and 
employment program to the NLC, as required by the Nabarlek agreement 
(O’Faircheallaigh 1995).  
 
What can be done to try and ensure effective implementation? Where a regional land 
council exists, it may be possible to have a dedicated unit or staff member(s) whose 
role is to monitor implementation of agreements. Thus, for example, the NLC 
established a Uranium Monitoring Unit to monitor implementation of the Ranger and 
Nabarlek units and of the impact of uranium mining in general. However more urgent 
pressures in relation to current negotiations or other land council business such as 
land claims tends to create pressure to divert resources from such units. This is 
exactly what happened with the Uranium Monitoring Unit: within 18 months it had 
been disbanded and its resources allocated elsewhere (O’Faircheallaigh 1995).  
 
Another approach is to insert provisions regarding monitoring of implementation in 
the mineral development agreement. The NLC now seeks to include an annual 
‘administration fee’ as part of the terms and conditions for granting of a mining lease 
on Aboriginal land. It is intended that this fee will cover the cost of monitoring 
compliance with the agreement (as well as paying, for example, for ongoing 
consultations with traditional owners). The NLC also seeks to include provisions 
regarding access to the project site and to relevant information, both required to 
ensure effective monitoring. To date these provisions have only been included in the 
‘mining parameters’ attached to exploration licence agreements and so it is too early 
to assess its effectiveness (O’Faircheallaigh 1995).  
 
In the case of the Cape Flattery agreement, the role of ensuring implementation was 
assigned to a Coordinating Committee made up of three members nominated by the 
company and three from Hope Vale. But problems arose in relation to funding of the 
community’s participation in this Committee, partly because it was decided that input 
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was required from Hope Vale’s legal advisers. The Skardon River agreement also 
provides for establishment of a Coordinating Committee, but in this case the company 
has agreed to fund community participation up to an agreed amount.  
 
More generally, an important way to enhance implementation of negotiated 
agreements is to raise the level of awareness regarding the need for effective 
implementation processes, partly by having more research published on the 
implementation of agreements as well as on their content and their negotiation. It was 
only when scholars in the United States began publishing detailed studies which 
examined the implementation of public policies in the 1970s, for example, that policy 
makers in liberal democracies also began to plan explicitly to ensure policy 
implementation, rather than just assume that it would happen. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Negotiation of mineral development agreements constitutes only one possible 
response by indigenous people to mining projects which affect their land or their 
communities. But it is an increasingly prevalent response in Australia, and is likely to 
become even more widespread as more indigenous Australians reassert ownership 
over land and the political climate makes it less and less acceptable for developers to 
ignore indigenous interests. There are also signs that agreements will increasingly be 
negotiated in relation to other types of development, such as tourism.5 
 
Negotiation of mineral development agreements can yield significant benefits to 
indigenous communities, but if positive outcomes are to eventuate they must develop 
appropriate processes and structures to identify community aspirations and concerns, 
obtain and apply relevant information and resources, and recruit and direct 
appropriate technical expertise. They must also ensure that agreements which in 
theory offer benefits (or allow significant costs to be avoided) are actually put into 
practice over extended periods of time. Given the resources, social and emotional as 
well as material, which are absorbed in negotiating with mining companies, it is 
especially important that communities, and their advisers, strive to effectively address 
the issues raised in this paper, and that governments support them in doing so.  
 
 
Notes  
 
1. Mineral development agreements are defined here as contractual arrangements 
entered into by Aboriginal organisations or communities under which they 
agree to support, or not to oppose, exploration or mining activity on land they 
own or claim, and in return are offered defined benefits which would not 
accrue to them as a result of standard commercial transactions or of general 
government policy. 
 
2. Howitt notes, in discussing gold mining in Central Australia, other difficulties 
which women face in having equal weight attached to their views in relation 
to mining (Howitt 1991: 130-31). 
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3. I am grateful to Jim Fingleton, Native Title Unit, Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Canberra, for this suggestion.  
 
4. Personal communication, Engineering and Environmental Officer, Northern 
Land Council, 14 April 1995. 
 
5. A current example is provided by the agreements being negotiated between 
developers and the Djabugay community in relation to the Tjapukai Cultural 
Theme Park and the Skyrail project, near Cairns. 
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